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BOOK REVIEWS 
MARK ROMANESKI* 
CRAZY STATES: A COUNTERCONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC 
PROBLEM. By YEHEZKEL DROR. Millwood, New York: Kraus Reprint, 
1980, 118 pp. $18.00, cloth. 
Shortly after World War II, Hans J. Morgenthau developed the "grand 
theory" approach to international politics.! Unlike previous political theoreti-
cians, Morgenthau eschewed the emphasis on historical and descriptive study. 
Instead, he developed a theoretical model that emphasizes the role of power 
politics. This model focused on generalizations rather than analyzing current 
events; it identified patterns of behavior and emphasized sources of state 
power. Through such an analytical model it was hoped that realism and 
predictability could be added to the study of world politics. A thorough 
understanding and judicious manipulation of the inputs into the model could 
purportedly lead to more success in the control of world affairs. 
Professor Yehezkel Dror has fashioned his own "grand theory" in Crazy 
States. 2 The purpose of his book is to create the analytical model by which 
foreign policy makers can understand, predict and even manipulate the 
behavior of crazy states. Professor Dror's theoretical framework adds 
coherence to otherwise confusing recent world developments. Perhaps the 
most convincing demonstration of the importance of his study to modern 
western nations has been the United States' attempts to cope with the ap-
parent irrationality of Khomeini's Iran. J Certainly, Professor Dror, combin-
ing elements of Machiavellian statecraft4 and Bismarck's Real Politik,5 presents 
a viable analytical framework for dealing with the problem of crazy states. 
'Mark Romaneski, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, is a staff member of the 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review. 
1. Set H. MORGENTHAU. POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1948). 
2. E.g., Y. DROR. CRAZY STATES (1980) [hereinafter cited as DROR). 
3. Set, e.g., Grim Lessons of Ihe Long Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1980, at pp. 57-60. 
4. For a view of power politics, see N. MACHIAVELLI. THE PRINCE (1513). 
5. See E. EYCK. BISMARK AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1968). 
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Such an achievement makes Crazy States valuable reading. However, the 
failure of the author to develop this framework by citing specific examples 
throughout history and in recent events is a major disappointment. 
Professor Dror is well qualified to write in the area of international politics. 
He resides in Israel, but has studied extensively in the United States. He was a 
Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, 
California, and was a senior professional staff member with the Rand Cor-
poration. Professor Dror has served as Senior Planning and Policy Analysis 
Advisor for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Currently, he is Professor of 
Political Science and Wolfson Professor of Public Administration at the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Professor Dror is also the editor of the 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. 
"Crazy state" is a term coined by Professor Dror. 6 The term refers to a 
"multiactor"7 which possesses five attributes: (1) pursuing aggressive goals 
which are often harmful to others; (2) displaying an intensely radical commit-
ment to such goals; (3) exhibiting a pervasive sense of moral superiority over 
others, despite a willingness to act immorally within the normal international 
framework; (4) realizing an ability to rationally select logical instruments to 
advance those goals;8 andeS) possessing external action capabilities sufficient 
to impact upon goal achievement. 9 Naturally, a crazy state would conform to 
the model in varying degrees. For example, crazy states exhibit different 
external-action capabilities lO depending upon communication ability, 
economic power and military strength. I I Also, some crazy states may be more 
willing to violate international codes of conduct than others. 
Today, the definition of crazy states applies to numerous multiactors on the 
world scene. Crazy state countries probably would include Qaddafi's Libya, 
Khomeini's Iran and Uganda before the fall of Idi Amin. Examples of non-
country crazy states would be the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish 
Republican Army and the Japanese Red Army. Present strategic studies are 
poorly equipped to deal with such multiactors. These multiactors are improv-
ing their ability to shape world events. Perhaps the ultimate in world terror 
would be a crazy state with possession of a nuclear weapon. 
6. The term is not intended to have psychiatric overtones as crazy states may act very rational-
ly in choosing methods of achieving irrational goals. DROR. supra note 2, at 23. Substitute terms 
such as "fanatic" or "true believer" states are probably more appropriate. [d., at xiv. 
7. A multiactor is defined as a unit of more than one person. /d. at xxvi. Multiactors are not 
limited to countries but can also include non-country organizations. /d. 
8. Crazy states often exhibit a willingness to undergo high risks in order to achieve certain 
benefits. This does not mean they are acting irrationally even if it may seem unreasonable to 
Western countries. [d. at xiv. 
9. [d. at xiii. 
10. See id. at 56, table 4-3. 
11. /d. 
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According to Professor Dror, to avoid such a predicament the crazy state 
issue must be identified in international policy making. Responsible nations of 
the world must prepare to counter the menace of crazy states. 
Professor Dror presents five theses upon which his analytic model is based. 
First, the present strategic models of western policy makers contain fallacies 
which prevent proper handling of crazy states. 12 A good example of one such 
fallacy is the "convex mirror" effect \\.hich results when other nations are 
viewed as a miniature - albeit distorted - version of the United States. The 
fallacy holds that, as these nations develop, they will become more like the 
United States. As a result of the fallacy, military aid to other nations often fails 
to recognize the receiving nation's unique needs and abilities. Consequently, 
attempts may be made to superimpose U.S. military doctrine and equipment 
upon countries with varying circumstances and needs. 
This fallacy holds true with economic aid. In the past, the U.S. has had a 
penchant toward foreign aid in the form of capital-intensive equipment. 13 In a 
developing nation, labor-intensive equipment would be more appropriate. 
Such equipment requires fewer spare parts which are often in short supply, 
employs more persons and consumes a smaller amount of costly petroleum 
products. 
Another example of a common fallacy in strategic studies is more problem-
atical. This fallacy claims that ideologies will fade and, therefore, need not be 
taken seriously. The latter portion of the fallacy need not be argued, but the 
former is certainly,proven by numerous historical examples. Professor Dror 
calls this "one of the most dangerous fallacies in the United States strategic 
thinking."14 Yet if there were not an element of truth to this fallacy the world 
would have, indeed, cause to despair. While, to the simple minded, it is pleas-
ing to say that a leopard cannot change his spots, it is the assumption upon 
which present policies are based. 15 Ditente with the Soviet Union, while 
somewhat out of favor in an election year and in the wake of the Afghanistan 
invasion, resulted in significant reductions of tension between East and West. 
This would not have been possible if the Soviet Union had not chosen its own 
self-interest (upon which detente is based) over its Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Other examples of fading ideologies might include the Camp David peace ac-
cords, Helmut Schmidt's Ostpolitik and the current U.S. reliance upon 
China's ability to playa role in the global balance of power. This is an area re-
quiring further study, but, to the casual reader, Professor Dror's "fallacy" 
seems questionable. 16 
12. For a list of such fallacies, Set id. at 4-20. 
13. See E.F. ScHUMACHER. SMALL [S BEAUTIFUL (1975). 
14. Set DROR, supra note 2, at xv-xvi. 
15. For a unique and opposite treatment with respect to Iran, set R. Clark, We Must Trust tIu 
Iranians, PROGRESS[VE, Aug. 1980, at 40-43. 
16. Perhaps there are times when ideology will rise above rational cost benefit analysis but 
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The second thesis upon which Crazy States is based may be self evident to the 
observer of world affairs: crazy states are increasingly commonY Professor 
Dror outlines the reasons for this trend, paralleling the thoughts of other 
writers on the various ways for political leadership to aggregate power. For ex-
ample, Professor W. Howard Wriggins of Columbia University writes: "[a] 
foreign scapegoat can become a target outside the nation, attracting 
freefloating hostility which might otherwise be directed against the 
leadership. "18 Such strategies can create liabilities for the multiactor. 19 Future 
assistance upon which the multiactor depends may be endangered, as it was 
for Iran when the U.S. imposed an economic embargo. 
Other factors which lead to the increasing occurrence of crazy states in-
clude: rapid modernization of traditional societies, thereby allowing insuffi-
cient time for the necessary social and political institutions to develop which 
can handle the stress created by modernization; ethnic diversity and long-
standing hatreds; disillusionment with the values of Western culture; 
economic scarcity; and political systems having one dominating personality. 20 
An additional, implied factor is the inability of western nations to deal effec-
tively with crazy states. Such inability often leads to positive reinforcement of 
crazy states. Another form of encouragement is the legitimization of crazy 
states through grants of recognition and the provision of a forum in interna-
tional political organizations such as the United Nations. 21 Professor Dror 
states that one point which the mass media should critically examine is its role 
in encouraging crazy states. 22 
Professor Dror's third thesis is that crazy states can be effective in achieving 
their goalS. 23 Global interdependence for raw materials, especially oil, and 
global struggle for access to strategic locations has aided this effectiveness. 
ideology is continually being sacrificed when the cost incurred becomes too great. A case in point 
is Iran, which quickly searched for a solution to the hostage crisis when the war with Iraq greatly 
increased the costs. See What Price the Hostages?, NEWSWEEK Nov. 17, 1980, at 44-55. 
17. DROR, supra note 2, at xvii. 
18. W.H. WRIGGINS, THE RULER'S IMPERATIVE 235 (1969). 
19. !d. at 236. 
20. DROR, supra note 2, at xvii. These "one personality" regimes often encourage a flam-
boyant and radical personality to lead a nation to "craziness." The personality embodies 
"charismatic"authority which may be the main source of political authority in some developing 
nations. Other sources which Max Weber has identified include "traditional" and "rational-
legal" authority. THE THEORY OF SocIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, 328, (T. Parsons, ed., 
1964). 
21. DROR, supra note 2, at xviii. 
22. Certainly, global publicity has exacerbated the Iranian hostage crisis. It limited the U.S. 
from a political viewpoint in an election year and it has given a commanding forum to an other-
wise unknown group of militants. Former Undersecretary of State, George Ball, recently stated: 
"Television has played this situation [the American hostages in Iran] up so that it has become the 
central issue of American policy which I think is absurd." The Hostages as "Soap Opera ", 
NEWSWEEK,Nov.17,1980,at57. 
23. DROR, supra note 2, at xviii-xix. 
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Such effectiveness bodes ill for the West as achievements encourage normally 
non-crazy states to adopt crazy state strategies. It may also have the effect of 
legitimizing the use of violence in obtaining goals; violence would become 
rampant if nations engage in low intensity warfare. 2* 
Certain "countercrazy" strategies are suggested by Professor Dror. These 
recommendations are very specific. 25 Professor Dror recommends the 
establishment of a working group for intelligence and planning on crazy 
states. Such a group would be sensitive to the crazy state analytical model and, 
consequently, would be better equipped to predict crazy behavior and to effec-
tively counter it. 
An additional countercrazy strategy would be to establish limits beyond 
which crazy states would not be permitted to transgress. 26 The most obvious 
embodiment of this strategy is Israel. It has indeed worked well for it on many 
occasions, including the Entebbe operation. The effectiveness of air strikes 
against targets outside Israeli borders in retaliation for terrorist acts is 
debatable. Those strikes have also helped to isolate Israel in the world com-
munity. The drawbacks of the "limits" strategy are apparent. Crazy states 
are willing to trespass beyond the realm of accepted international law. 
Therefore, failure to meet their demands could lead to human tragedy. Not all 
would agree with Professor Dror and with Israel that the short term benefits of 
negotiations are outweighed by the long term costs of capitulation. 27 The basic 
idea is sound; however, crazy states should not be positively rewarded as such 
reward could encourage craziness. 
Perhaps the most alarming countercrazy strategy is the action which Pro-
fessor Dror suggests in order to limit the external-action capabilities of crazy 
states, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. While preventing the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons is a worthy objective, engaging in violence to 
meet that goal may be counterproductive. Self defense traditionally is a 
justification for armed intervention, but it is an exception to generally ac-
cepted norms. 28 Professor Dror seems to have an alarming tendency for 
recommending violence a~ a means of counteracting crazy states. 29 The 
24. Id. at xix. 
25. For a complete listing, see DROR, supra note 2, at xx-xxiii, 73-91. 
26. DROR, supra note 2, at xxi. 
27. /d. at 87. 
28. See generally, Weightman, Self-defense in International Law, 37 VA. L. REV. 1095 (1951). See 
U. N. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs, reprinted in 60 AM. J . 
INT'L L. 662 (1966). 
29. Professor Dror advocates such ideas as "stimulation of revolt," DROR, supra note 2, at 84; 
"occupation of a c' uy state may be unavoidable," id. at 84; and destroying external-action 
capabilities through a "counterforce nuclear strike, sabotage, airborne strike, [and) conventional 
spot bombing." Id. at 84. Finally, he believes that when capitulation is unavoidable, it should 
only be accompanied by "various activities to build up an underground working against the 
crazy state and directed toward its ultimate defeat, reversal. and - if nothing else works -
destruction." Id. at 87. 
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United States would pay an enormous price in the loss of international stand-
ing by adopting such tactics except under the limited circumstances of defend-
ing the most vital of strategic interests. In part, the present ostracization of 
Israel is due to its use of violence as a countercrazy strategy. Is it in the interest 
of the U.S. to pay such a price? 
Professor Dror ends, somewhat pessimistically, with his final thesis that 
western policy makers will not innovate the strategies that are necessary to 
blunt the effect of crazy states. 30 In other words, he believes that his recoT'l-
mendations will not be adopted. Some readers might view that conclusion 
with optimism and would prefer that international affairs be handled with a 
moral and legal orientation. Professor Dror offers no solutions but merely an 
area of further speculation and future study. 
Perhaps the major criticism of Crazy States is its lack of historical perspective 
to the analytical model. In fairness to Professor Dror, it should be noted that 
his expressed purpose was not to relate historical or current events to his 
model, but to establish a "global systems framework. "31 He wanted to en-
courage further theoretical and applied studies of crazy states. 32 Although he 
considers the past an unreliable guide for the future, 33 he makes allusions to 
crazy states of the past and future, such as Nazi Germany, the Crusades, 
Islam Holy Warriors, and contemporary terrorist groupS.34 Unfortunately, 
Professor Dror fails to develop those examples within the context of his 
analytical model. Failure to apply historical analysis skews his viewpoint of 
present reality. For example, in discussing the dangers of nuclear prolifera-
tion, Professor Dror states that there are no historical examples of failure to 
use available weapons. 35 Yet, in World War II, all parties refrained from the 
use of poison gas despite its availability and despite the fact that Nazi Ger-
many fit the definition of a crazy state. 36 
Another disappointment of Crazy States is a failure to apply the model to a 
framework of international legal principles. 37 Even crazy states can recognize 
the reality of internationallaw: 38 they make excuses as to why their immoral 
behavior is justified rather than flatly stating that international law does not 
exist. Perhaps some of these disputes could be resolved within the context of 
international arbitration and adjudication, as provided by international law . 39 
30. /d. at xxiii-xxiv. 
31. /d. at xxv. 
32. /d. at xxvi. 
33. Id. at xxvi, 16. 
34. /d. at 23. 
35. Id. at 16. 
36. See T. Ropp. WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (1962). 
37. See generally, E. LEFEVER, ETHICS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1967); D. 
Acheson, Morality, Moralism, and Diplomacy, 47 YALE REVIEW 481-493 (1958). 
38. See Jessup, The Reality of International Law, 18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 244 Oan 1940). 
39. See generally, J.L. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS (1963). 
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It is to the credit of the United States that it continued to exhaust every legal 
remedy available, such as the World Court and the United Nations, in at-
tempting to secure the release of the American hostages in Iran. 40 
The United States will increasingly become the target of crazy states. 41 Part 
of the attractiveness of making the U.S. a target is due to the self-restraint it 
often exercises as a civilized nation. Also, the U.S. symbolizes the ultimate in 
Western culture and is both the scorn and envy of the have-nots. As a world 
power, the U.S. maintains a global presence which offers attractive, dispersed 
targets to crazy states in their own remote corner of the world. Certainly, the 
U.S. will have to improve its ability to counter crazy states. Professor Dror's 
own "grand theory" of crazy states goes a long way in achieving that end, 
especially as Crazy States spawns further study and thought on this important 
Issue. 
40. The World Court did render final judgment in the U.S. case against Iran For text of the 
judgment and the State Department statement of May 24, 1980, Stt, DEPT. S'lATE BULL. 80: 
43-70, Ouly 1980). 
41. DROR. supra note 2, at xix. 
